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Abstract: Users of the Tor anonymity system suf-
fer from less-than-ideal performance, in part because
circuit building and selection processes are not tuned
for speed. In this paper, we examine both the pro-
cess of selecting among pre-built circuits and the pro-
cess of selecting the path of relays for use in building
new circuits to improve performance while maintain-
ing anonymity. First, we show that having three pre-
built circuits available allows the Tor client to iden-
tify fast circuits and improves median time to first byte
(TTFB) by 15% over congestion-aware routing, the cur-
rent state-of-the-art method. Second, we propose a new
path selection algorithm that includes broad geographic
location information together with bandwidth to reduce
delays. In Shadow simulations, we find 20% faster me-
dian TTFB and 11% faster median total download times
over congestion-aware routing for accessing webpage-
sized objects. Our security evaluations show that this
approach leads to better or equal security against a
generic relay-level adversary compared to Tor, but in-
creased vulnerability to targeted attacks. We explore
this trade-off and find settings of our system that offer
good performance, modestly better security against a
generic adversary, and only slightly more vulnerability
to a targeted adversary.
Keywords: Tor network, performance, relay selection,
circuit selection
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1 Introduction
Tor provides anonymity for millions of users around the
world by routing their traffic over paths selected from
approximately 7,000 volunteer-run relays.1 Tor effec-
tively hides the user among all the users, so having more
users and more traffic enhances anonymity for all [7, 11].
Unfortunately, Tor users often face large delays and long
download times, which can discourage users and thereby
reduce anonymity. In this paper, we examine two ap-
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proaches to improve Tor performance and evaluate them
in term of both performance and security.
Circuit Selection. The client’s traffic in Tor goes
through a three-hop encrypted channel, called a circuit.
When the user makes a request, such as for a webpage,
Tor attaches the new stream (by opening a SOCKS con-
nection) to a circuit. The Tor client builds circuits pre-
emptively based on the client’s use or immediately if
there is no current circuit to handle the stream. Tor
currently does not use any performance criteria in se-
lecting a circuit. In this paper, we evaluate using the
length of the circuits, their congestion, the Round Trip
Time (RTT), or a combination of them in choosing a
fast circuit. We also find that the number of available
circuits in Tor is often small, between one and three cir-
cuits, such that picking the best circuit for performance
does not have much effect in practice. As the number
of available circuits increases, the chance of finding a
fast and high performance circuit should increase. To
this end, for each circuit selection criteria we study, we
evaluate the impact of more available circuits in terms
of both performance and security.
Relay Selection. For circuit selection to be effective,
some of the available circuits must be reasonably high
performing. To improve the chances of this, we modify
the relay selection mechanism to build short and high-
bandwidth circuits. Tor clients select paths in a way
that balances traffic load among the relays according
to their advertised bandwidths, but they do not make
any consideration for the locations of relays relative to
the clients, their destinations, or the other relays in the
path. Paths can jump around the globe, which is intu-
itively good for anonymity but measurably bad for per-
formance.
Prior work has examined improving path selection
in Tor for better performance, considering factors such
as bandwidth [29], congestion [34], latency [28], and lo-
cation [8].
Wacek et al. performed a comprehensive study of
path selection [33], and they found that congestion-
aware routing [34] offers the best combination of per-
formance and anonymity among the tested approaches.
They also found that approaches that emphasized la-
tency but failed to consider bandwidth had poor per-
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formance, and they suggested that an approach that
optimized both latency and bandwidth could do better
than any of their tested approaches. In this paper, we
take on this suggestion and explore designs that address
both criteria.
We make the following contributions:
– We define nine circuit selection approaches using
the geographical length, circuit delay, congestion,
or a combination of these. We evaluate each of the
approaches and compare them experimentally.
– In our relay selection approach, combined weight-
ing, we explore the design of a single weighting
function that balances bandwidth and geographical
inter-node distance. We examine the design issues
in our approach and compare it with the state of
the art.
– To prevent delays, it is important to build circuits in
advance of their use [33]. Since we want to use des-
tination location information to better inform our
path-selection strategy, we build circuits in advance,
using popular destinations as the end points. We
then select from among these circuits base on our
findings in circuit selection approaches.
– We show the results of experiments on our ap-
proaches in Shadow, following the methodology of
Jansen et al. [19], and we examine a range of param-
eters. We find a number of settings in our proposed
methods that offer reasonable anonymity and sig-
nificant performance improvements over congestion-
aware routing, the current state-of-the-art in Tor
path selection. In particular, our recommended ap-
proach provides a 20% reduction in median time to
first byte and a 11% reduction in median time to
last byte compared to congestion-aware routing.
– We also measure the security of our approaches us-
ing Gini coefficient and entropy on first-and-last
combinations, with the rate of path compromise in
the presence of relay-level and AS-level adversaries,
and in the presence of four targeted relay-level at-
tacks. We find that both of our approaches provide
anonymity in line with Tor at settings that also
provide significant performance improvements. Our
recommended approach has a slightly better Gini
coefficient and entropy than Tor, with slightly fewer
compromised paths against our attackers.
2 Related work
Researchers have addressed Tor performance issues in
a variety of ways, such as modifying circuit schedul-
ing [31], congestion control [34], traffic splitting [9],
and incentives to encourage users to offer their band-
width [13, 22]. In this section, we first briefly overview
Tor’s current path selection mechanism and then dis-
cuss the prior works on enhancing performance in Tor
from circuit selection and relay selection point of view.
Tor. Tor is a volunteer-based overlay network pro-
viding anonymity online. Details are available at http:
//www.torproject.org/ and in the original design pa-
per [12]. In Tor, the choice of relays is governed a com-
plex weighting function2 that includes various consider-
ations and the bandwidths of the relays. Weighting by
bandwidths serves to balance load in the system, as re-
lays have huge variance in advertised bandwidth, with
the bottom quintile under 2 Mbps, a median of about
10 Mbps, and a maximum of 1 Gbps as of May 2016.3
Circuit Selection. Can et al. [31] propose a circuit
scheduling mechanism that gives high priority to inter-
active traffic over bulk traffic on the same connection.
This circuit selection mechanism has been deployed in
Tor relays, but it has no impact on the client. Our cir-
cuit selection approaches are designed to improve the
performance from the client side and are thus orthogo-
nal to scheduling in the relays.
Wang et al. introduce node latency as a parameter
to measure a relay’s congestion [34]. In their approach,
congestion-aware routing (CAR), the client calculates
congestion delay using both active and opportunistic
methods. It then uses the measured latency to avoid
congested nodes during path selection and to avoid se-
lecting congested paths. They use both short-term and
long-term congestion in their work, where short-term
congestion is caused by current traffic levels and long-
term congestion is caused by the relay’s bandwidth.
Their results show improvement in quality of service
and load balancing. In our evaluation of circuit selection
methods, we also examine the use of congestion times
and compare them with RTTs and circuit lengths.
The current Tor client measures the Circuit Build
Time (CBT), i.e. the time to construct the circuit, and
uses this to discard slow circuits whose CBT is above a
2 Full details at https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/
dir-spec.txt.
3 http://metrics.torproject.org/
Modified Relay Selection and Circuit Selection for Faster Tor 3
client-specific threshold. Annessi and Schmiedecker [10]
propose that Tor should use the circuit round trip times
(RTTs) in eliminating slow circuits instead of CBTs. In
this method, the circuit RTT is actively measured after
the circuit is built, and if it is longer than a timeout the
circuit is discarded from future uses. In their study, this
provided only 3% improvement in the time to down-
load the first byte with mixed anonymity results. Our
strategy in this paper is different from both approaches.
Rather than examining circuits after their creation to
discard them or keep them, we instead try to pick a
high performing circuits in the first place.
Relay Selection. A number of improvements to Tor
path selection have been investigated [8, 28, 29]. Wacek
et al. examine Tor path selection in a comprehensive
study with experiments running many simultaneous
clients [33]. They create a model of the Tor network
to evaluate the recent published papers modifying path
selection and show results for throughput, time to last
byte (TTLB), and round-trip time (RTT). They tested
Tor, Snader/Borisov [29], Unweighted Tor, in which Tor
relays get selected uniformly at random, Coordinate [28]
in which path selection is based on estimated pair-wise
latencies, LASTor [8], and Congestion-Aware [34]. Their
investigation shows that path selection algorithms that
do not consider bandwidth as a factor in relay selection
have poor performance. Congestion-aware had nearly
the best performance in throughput and time-to-first-
byte, plus it had anonymity approximately in line with
Tor and significantly better than other high-performing
algorithms. We thus select it for comparison in our work.
Improving performance can also affect attackers, po-
tentially providing them better attacking opportunities
and more accurate measurements. There are several at-
tacks that use latency and throughput information to
de-anonymize Tor users [16, 18, 26]. Geddes et al. [17]
introduced a new class of attacks, called induced throt-
tling, that exploit performance-enhancing mechanisms
to throttle and unthrottle a circuit and identify the
user. They evaluated the vulnerability of performance
improvements, such as congestion control and traffic ad-
mission control to these attacks, and they found that
there are highly effective attacks that can uniquely iden-
tify users. While this does not directly affect our ap-
proaches, we recognize that there is generally a trade-off
between anonymity and performance.
3 Model and Goals
3.1 Network Model
Testing new path and circuit selection strategies on the
live Tor network is challenging and could compromise
users’ anonymity or their harm their performance. We
perform our simulations in Shadow [4, 21], a discrete-
event simulator that runs the Tor code in a complete,
but scaled-down, network. Shadow simulates the under-
lying network and it considers network attributes such
as packet loss, bandwidth upstream and downstream,
jitter, latency, and network edges. In our performance
evaluations, we used a scaled-down model of Tor, which
consists of 1100 clients and 220 relays; this scaled-down
model was built based on the procedures of Jansen et
al. [19] and measurements from the live Tor network
(from July 2015). In our security evaluations, we use a
larger scaled-down model of 2127 relays with one client
at a time.
3.2 Attacker Model
As with prior work in Tor performance [8, 28, 29, 33],
our attention is more on performance characteristics
than on attacks. We only seek to validate that our ap-
proach does not significantly weaken the anonymity pro-
vided by Tor currently. We evaluate the security of our
proposed mechanisms in terms of both relay-level and
network-level adversaries.
Relay-Level Adversary Model. In the relay-level
adversary model, we assume that the adversary is run-
ning some Tor relays in the network with the goal of
getting into the guard and exit positions of some cir-
cuits. An adversary in such a position can observe the
entry and exit traffic and correlate them to link the
clients to their destinations. To evaluate the security of
our proposed circuit selection mechanism, we simulate
our proposed method, CAR, and vanilla Tor in Shadow
and randomly mark one of our guards and one of our ex-
its as malicious relays. We then extract the streams and
identify which ones were compromised. We repeat this
process 10 times, and measure the compromise rates all
over 10 repetitions.
To evaluate the security of our proposed relay se-
lection mechanism at the relay level, we first follow the
approach of Wacek et al., who use the Gini coefficient
and entropy as measures of the diversity of paths taken
by each of their studied approaches [33]. We consider
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a high-bandwidth attacker who adds a modest number
of high-bandwidth ORs into the Tor network. Since our
path selection algorithm uses distance as well as band-
width, leading to our path selection algorithms pick
high-bandwidth ORs with short distance more often,
this attacker is aimed at capturing a large number of
circuits. We also consider four targeted attack strategies
in which the attacker targets a specific client, a specific
destination, a specific client and destination, or with no
specific target. In all these strategies, the attacker places
his relays in the target’s exact location to have minimum
distance and a high chance to be selected. Our targeted
attack scenarios are thus worst cases.
Network-Level Adversary Model. The adversary
can control some network components like ASes or
IPXs. If the entry traffic and exit traffic of an anony-
mous connection traverse through the adversary’s net-
work components, the adversary observes both sides of
the traffic and deanonymizes the clients. We evaluate
the security of our circuits selection mechanisms and
relays selection mechanisms in the network level. In cir-
cuits selection and relay selection mechanisms, we sim-
ulate each of the proposed mechanisms in Shadow and
extract the streams, including their paths. To determine
the compromised streams, we use the algorithm pro-
posed by Qiu and Gao [27] to infer the AS paths on both
the entry side of the circuit (between clients and guards)
and and exit side (between exits and servers). Qiu and
Gao’s algorithm exploits known paths from BGP tables
to improve the inferred paths. In measuring the compro-
mise rates, we consider the possibility of an asymmetric
traffic correlation attack that can happen between data
path and ack path, which is one of the RAPTOR attacks
proposed by Sun et al. [30].
3.3 Design Goals
We seek an algorithm that meets the following goals:
1.Interactive use like web browsing should be signif-
icantly faster than Tor and prior work.
2.Performance for bulk downloads should not be sig-
nificantly slowed compared to Tor.
3.Anonymity should be similar to what Tor cur-
rently provides against our selected attack models.
4.Usage should be fairly distributed among relays
according to their available capacities.
5.Clients should be able to select paths with little
computational or other overhead.
6.Circuits should be available to the client for at-
taching streams to when needed.
7.We should avoid downloading large amounts of
additional information from the directory servers.
We emphasize web traffic since delays in interactive use
are more harmful to the user experience than delays in
bulk downloads. We consider both response time, mea-
sured as time to first byte (TTFB), and total download
time, measured as time to last byte (TTLB).
Note that we do not seek the optimal latency for cir-
cuits. Although having accurate latency information in-
stead of geographic distance could further improve per-
formance, the gains might be marginal given require-
ments for bandwidth and path diversity. Further, ob-
taining and distributing accurate pairwise latency in-
formation may be expensive due to the necessary mea-
surements and directory server overhead.
4 Circuit Selection
When a Tor client issues a request, the new stream is
handled by one of the available circuits. In this section
we explain how Tor tries to provide some available cir-
cuits for new streams and how it attaches the streams
to the circuits. Then we explain how the stream at-
tachment can be improved by increasing the number of
circuits and considering performance criteria in circuit
selection.
Pre-Built Circuits. As the user browses the Web
with Tor, the Tor client opens new circuits so that later
streams can be attached to those circuits without delay.
Since different exits support different sets of ports, the
Tor client aims to keep open two circuits to cover any
port that the user has used recently. In practice, one or
two circuits are typically available at any given time.
On-Demand Circuits. Sometimes the user’s re-
quested streams are not supported by current available
circuits, or all available circuits are older than 10 min-
utes and considered dirty. In this case, Tor builds a cir-
cuit for the unhandled stream and attaches the stream
to this circuit. It is obvious that these streams expe-
rience more delay than streams using pre-built circuits
due to the circuit built time.
Tor Stream Attachment. When a new stream is cre-
ated, the Tor client selects the most recently created
circuit or creates a new circuit if needed and attaches
the new stream to it. Then all communication on that
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stream, including DNS resolution, goes through the cir-
cuit.
4.1 Performance in Circuit Selection
The Tor client does not use performance as a crite-
ria when selecting from available circuits for attach-
ing a stream. Wang et al. [34] propose to use the least
congested circuit, but there are several possible perfor-
mance characteristics to use instead. Also, we know of
no study testing the effect of changing number of cir-
cuits on performance-based selection.
To investigate the effect of circuit selection on Tor
performance, we evaluate both the number of available
circuits for the streams and the way we choose the best
circuit among the available circuits. To set the number
of circuits, we check once per second that there are at
least N circuits to support all recently used ports. If
there are fewer than N circuits, then we start building
circuits to reach the threshold. We compare vanilla Tor,
which typically offers one or two circuits, with making
between three and five circuits available. Given some
number of circuits, we can then use various methods to
select the best one. We compare various combinations
of geographic circuit length, congestion, and round trip
time (RTT).
Metrics. To find the total geographic circuit length
(or simply length) L between the client and destination,
we compute:
L = DCG +DGM +DME +DExit (1)
DCG, DGM , DME and DExit are shown in Figure 1a for
when the destination IP address is known and Figure 1b
for when the IP address is not yet known.
We use the opportunistic circuit measurements and
latency model proposed by Wang et al. [34] to measure
the circuit round-trip times and congestion times. Con-
gestion time Tc is measured as:
Tc = RTT −RTTmin (2)
where RTT is the round-trip time and RTTmin is the
minimum RTT observed over that circuit. Wang et
al. [34] showed that five measurements can effectively
identify congested circuits. We thus measure and store
the mean of the last five Tc measurements as the con-
gestion time of the circuit.
4.2 Attaching Streams to Circuits
We consider nine different methods in handling streams
using circuit length, congestion, and RTT.
1.Congestion Only: Pick by lowest congestion time.
2.Length Only: Pick the shortest circuit.
3.RTT Only: Pick the circuit with the lowest RTT.
4.Congestion then length: Select the two lowest con-
gestion times and pick the shorter one.
5.RTT then length: Select the two lowest RTTs and
pick the shorter one.
6.Length then congestion: Select the two shortest
circuits and pick the lower congestion time.
7.Length then RTT : Select the two shortest circuits
and pick the lower RTT.
8.RTT then Congestion: Select the two circuits with
lowest RTT and pick the lower congestion time.
9.Congestion then RTT : Select the two circuits with
lowest congestion time and pick the lower RTT.
Since these circuit selection mechanisms are determin-
istic, given a set of candidate circuits, only one circuit
from a set will be be used. These strategies will exploit
the best circuit for the full 10-minute window that the
circuit can be used. Since this means that the other cir-
cuits will go unused, we have the OP close any circuits
that go unused for five minutes after their creation, lead-
ing to new circuits being opened. By itself, this might
improve performance, as inferior circuits are closed in
favor of untested circuits that may be better (or worse).
5 Circuit Selection Performance
We now evaluate the nine methods of selecting circuits
for stream attachment and compare them with Tor and
CAR.
5.1 Network Configuration
We largely follow the experimental procedures sug-
gested by Jansen et al. [19] and describe them here in
brief. Shadow runs actual Tor code for accurate model-
ing; we used Tor version 0.2.5.12, modifying it as neces-
sary to implement our methods and CAR. To generate
a realistic Tor network topology, Shadow comes with
topology generation tools that model a private Tor net-
work based on a validated research study [19]. We used
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Fig. 2. Circuit Selection: TTLB and TTFB for web clients.
these tools and data from the Tor metrics portal to gen-
erate our private Tor network. Our Tor network includes
1100 clients, 220 Tor relays (52 exit relays, including
exit-guard relays, and 49 guard relays), three directory
authorities, and 220 HTTP destination servers.
Shadow uses an underlying topology that models
the Internet. The default topology shipped with Shadow
is very small, consisting of only 183 vertices and 17,000
edges, and is not a good representation of the Internet.
For all the simulations in this paper we used the Inter-
net topology used by Jansen at al. [20]. This topology is
provided by techniques from recent research in modeling
Tor typologies [19, 23], traceroute data from CAIDA [2],
data from the Tor Metrics Portal [32] and Alexa [1],
and it includes 699,029 vertices and 1,338,590 edges.
In our simulation, we tried different ratios of clients to
relays, i.e. different congestion levels, and different aver-
age packet loss rates in the Internet topology and com-
pared our results with Torperf data [32]. We found that
a clients-to-relays ratio of 5:1 with 0.0025% packet loss
provides us comparable results on TTFB and TTLB-
with Torperf data.
Our clients run Tor code in client-only mode and
are distributed around the world in line with Tor usage
statistics. We have two types of clients in our experi-
ments: web clients and bulk clients. The 900 web clients
download 320 KiB of data and simulate web surfing be-
havior by waiting between 1 to 20 seconds uniformly
at random before starting the next download. The 100
bulk clients download 5 MiB of data without pausing
between the end of a download and starting the next
one. This methodology is proposed in [19].
5.2 CAR: Congestion-Aware Routing
To compare our methods, we also simulated CAR, the
circuit selection technique of Wang et al. [34]. They pro-
posed opportunistic and active probing techniques to
measure congestion times, which are obtained by RTTs
in Equation 2, and use these measurements to mitigate
congestion using both an instant response for temporary
congestion and a long-term response for low-bandwidth
conditions. In our simulation, we follow the method of
Wacek et al. [33], who also simulated CAR and ignored
the long-term response due to its small impact on per-
formance.
When attaching streams to circuits in CAR, we ran-
domly select three circuits from the circuit list and pick
the one that has the smallest mean congestion time from
the five most recent measurements. If the mean of last
five congestion times is more than 0.5 seconds for a cir-
cuit, we stop using the circuit for new streams.
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5.3 Performance Results
Figure 2 shows the median time-to-first-byte (TTFB)
and time-to-last byte (TTLB) for web clients. vanilla
represents unmodified Tor circuit selection, and No
change represents the case we do not modify the num-
ber of circuits from Tor, which typically has one or two
circuits available at a time.
As shown in Figure 2, RTT is best criterion to
choose the circuit, with RTT Only as the best method
overall. RTT Only has 15% lower TTFB than CAR
(22% lower than vanilla) for three circuits and 22%
lower TTFB than CAR (27% lower than vanilla) for
five circuits. RTT Only also has 9% lower TTLB than
CAR (13.8% lower than vanilla) for three circuits and
12% lower TTLB than CAR (16% lower than vanilla for
five circuits. We speculate that RTT is the best criteria
because it effectively captures both propagation delays
and congestion time (queuing delays and transmission
delays).
As expected, CAR is better than vanilla, and Con-
gestion Only with no change in the number of circuits
performs the same as CAR, as both use the same cri-
teria. Length turns out to be less effective compared to
RTT or congestion times, particularly when the number
of circuits is small. We note that Length Then RTT per-
forms fairly well for three or more circuits. Length may
be suitable for gauging broad performance information,
such as comparing a circuit with multiple intercontinen-
tal hops to one with no such hops, but poor at predicting
the best circuit otherwise.
The TTFB and TTLB for RTT Then Congestion
are slightly better than Congestion Then RTT, which
indicates that RTT can narrow down candidate circuits
better than congestion times. Results of both RTT Then
Congestion and Congestion Then RTT are worse than
RTT Only and show that mixing congestion time with
RTTs will not provide better performance than using
RTT by itself.
5.4 Circuit Creation Analysis
In our circuit selection strategies we build more circuits
than Tor normal behavior, so it is important to under-
stand the load this imposes on the network. Unfortu-
nately, Shadow does not provide results regarding the
load on nodes. To estimate changes in load, we com-
pare the strategies based on the number of created cir-
cuits and used circuits. To see how many circuits our
clients build, we simulate the circuit selection strategies
in Shadow for one hour of simulated time, which leads
to about 40 minutes of activity after 20 minutes of ini-
tialization. We extract the number of general-purpose
circuits built by our web clients. Figure 3 shows the
CDF of created general purpose circuits and the CDF
of used circuits, the circuits actually being used. We see
that web clients in vanilla, CAR, RTT Only with the
same number of circuits as Tor, and RTT Only with 3-5
circuits. The median of created circuits in RTT Only
is 17, 23, and 29 circuits as we increase the number
of circuits from 3 to 5. RTT Only leads to building
so many circuits due to proactively checking every sec-
ond that there are N circuits available for each recently
used port, plus killing unused circuits after five minutes.
Fig. 3.b shows how many of these created circuits have
been used in transferring data. The median for used
circuits in vanilla, CAR, and RTT Only with no change
in the number of circuits is around four circuits, which
means that they use all the circuits created and attach
some stream to them. The median in RTT Only is 8,
10, and 13 circuits, respectively.
6 Security Analysis
In this section we examine the security of these cir-
cuit selection strategies, considering both relay-level
and network-level adversaries. Our performance results
showed that RTT Only outperforms all the other circuit
selection strategies and CAR. Therefore, in this section,
we focus on the security analysis of RTT Only.
6.1 Relay-Level Adversary
In relay-level adversary model, we assume that the ad-
versary runs both guard and exit relays in the hope that
his relays simultaneously occupy the guard and exit po-
sitions in some circuits. If the adversary can sit on the
exit and guard position on a circuit, he can apply a traf-
fic correlation attack and link the client to her destina-
tions. These circuits and streams attached to them are
called compromised circuits and compromised streams,
respectively. To analyze the security of the RTT Only
strategy, we need to have access to RTTs (which include
propagation delays, queuing delays, and transmission
delays), which means we need to simulate a whole net-
work. To do this, we use again Shadow to simulate the
Tor network, and we use the same Tor network config-
uration as our performance evaluations in Section 5.1,
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Fig. 4. Relay adversary: the distribution of compromise rates
which consists of 52 exit relays, including exit-guard re-
lays, and 49 guard relays.
For the relay-level adversary, we randomly mark
10% of our guard bandwidth and 10% of our exit band-
width as malicious guards and malicious exit relays in
the network, then we simulate CAR, vanilla, and using
three to five circuits with RTT Only. We run 10 simu-
lations, where the malicious guards and exits change in
each run. 10 simulations for each case is reasonable con-
sidering that we have 52 exit relays, 49 guards, and sim-
ulations taking 11 hours. Figure 4 shows the distribution
of stream compromised rates for clients. The median of
compromised streams is almost the same for vanilla,
CAR, and RTT Only with no change in the number of
circuits because the clients build almost the same num-
ber of circuits. As the number of circuits increases the
median of compromised streams rate increases due to
the increase in circuits created by the clients. When the
number of circuits increases, the chance of creating a cir-
cuit which has a malicious relays on its guard and exit
position increases. As we see, RTT Only with 5 circuits
has the highest compromised streams.
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6.2 Network Level Adversary
In the network-level adversary model, we assume that
the adversary controls an Autonomous System (AS). If
the entry traffic (traffic between the client and guard)
and exit traffic (traffic between the exit and server) tra-
verse over a common AS, that AS can apply traffic cor-
relation attack and link the client to her destinations.
To analyze the security of circuit selection strate-
gies, we used our simulation results from the relay-level
adversary for CAR, vanilla, and each circuit numbers
in RTT Only in Shadow. Because we did not add any
relays to the network in evaluating the relay-level ad-
versary model and we only marked existing relays as
malicious we can re-use their results in this selection.
For each circuit selection approach, we extract all the
generated streams by clients. The simulations gener-
ated approximately 730,000 streams for each circuit se-
lection approach, or about 700 streams per client. For
each stream, we used the algorithm proposed by Qiu
and Gao [27] to infer the AS paths between clients and
guards and between exits and servers. This algorithm
exploits known paths from BGP tables to improve the
inferred paths. In measuring the compromise rates, we
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consider the possibility of asymmetric traffic correlation
attack that can happen between the data path and ack
path, which is one of the RAPTOR attacks proposed by
Sun et al. [30].
Figure 5 shows the cumulative distribution of com-
promise rates for each strategy. As we see, when we
increase the number of circuits from 3 to 5, the median
compromise rate increases from 27.2% to 28.1% which
are 0.7% to 4% worse than CAR. CAR performs 1%
better than vanilla. These results show that using RTT
and increasing the number of circuits even up to five
circuits have a very limited effect on the security in the
network level adversary. Figure 5 shows the cumulative
distribution of compromise rates for each strategy.
7 Relay Selection
In this section, we describe a method for path selection
in which we assign weights to relays based on a com-
bination of bandwidth and geographical distances. This
approach extends the idea of Tor path selection, which
uses weights based on various factors in probabilistic
relay selection. The goal of the combined weighting ap-
proach is to build circuits that still have high bandwidth
relays, ensuring load balancing and good throughput,
but also relatively shorter paths between the client and
her destinations.
7.1 Weight Function
In a large and growing network like Tor, which consists
of around 7000 nodes as of August 2016, examining all
possible paths to find ones with these characteristics
would be expensive. Clustering relays into geographic
areas, as in LASTor [8], can lead to uneven distribution
of bandwidth between clusters. Instead, we approach
the problem much like Tor’s current algorithm by se-
lecting one relay at a time, starting with the exit node,
then the entry node, and finally the middle node. This
greedy approach may miss the optimal path, for some
definition of optimal, but our design aims to select from
a wide range of paths with good performance and to
avoid poorly performing paths. A broader selection of
paths should help us maintain anonymity.
We calculate the weight of each relay using following
function:
w = α× wB + (1− α)× wD
where wB is a measure of the relay’s bandwidth and wD
is a measure of distance. In this function, α is parameter
that we can use to tune the share of bandwidth and dis-
tance in the weights. As α increases, the importance of
bandwidth to the weight increases, and as α decreases,
the importance of distance to the weight increases. wB
and wD for relay i are computed as follows:
wBi =
Bi
Bmax
, wDi = 1−
Di
Dmax
Here, Bi is the relay’s weighted bandwidth, and Bmax
is the maximum weighted bandwidth among all relays.
Tor assigns weights for each position in the circuit, and
these weights bias the relay selection for circuits to dis-
tribute more load to higher-bandwidth relays. Di is a
distance that is computed differently depending on the
selected relay’s role in the circuit as exit, middle, or en-
try. The maximum value of Di over all relays is Dmax.
We subtract the ratio from 1 so as to weight short dis-
tances more than long ones. Note that both wB and wD
will be between 0 and 1.
Figure 6 shows how we compute the distance for
relays for each position in the circuit. We seek to mini-
mize total distance from the client to the destination by
minimizing the intermediate pairs of distances that are
added by each relay in the sequence used by Tor: exit,
entry, middle. Intuitively, selecting one of these relays
with a large distance to its neighbors extends the path
away from a straight line between client and destination,
which would theoretically be the ideal path.
Since we use geographic locations, we compute D
using the great-circle distance between two points on a
sphere from their longitudes and latitudes. In choosing
the circuit’s exit node, we compute D for all relays as
follows:
Dexit = (1− λ)×Dclient−exit + λ×Dexit−dest
For the circuit’s entry node:
Dentry = λ×Dclient−entry + (1− λ)×Dentry−exit
And for the circuit’s middle node
Dmiddle = Dentry−middle +Dmiddle−exit
Dmax in wD is the maximum computed D among the
set of relays for each position (exit, entry, or middle).
The use of Dmax and Bmax ensure that wD and wB
both range between 0 and 1 for more straightforward
calculations.
λ is a tuning parameter that enables us to change
the share of the distance between different nodes on the
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path. As shown in Figure 7, as λ goes up, the entry
nodes and exit nodes move toward the source and des-
tination, respectively, and a large portion of the path
between the source and destination is covered by inter-
relay connections. In this case, the selected guards are
close to the clients which can decrease the threat of
network level adversaries. In particular, it causes the
AS paths between clients and guards to be shorter and
involve fewer ASes, thereby decreasing the chance that
a common AS appears on both sides of the traffic, i.e.
between the client and guard and between the exit and
server. We will evaluate the effect of nearby guards in
Sections 9.2 and Appendix A. As λ decreases, the path’s
inter-relay portion shrinks.
To evaluate how close the short paths selected by
our algorithm are to optimal, we used a scaled-down
Tor network, with 147 exit nodes, 700 middle nodes, and
170 entry nodes, a user located in the central US, and
100 destinations from the Alexa Top 100 websites [1].
We found short paths between the user and all destina-
tions with our method for different values of λ. To mea-
sure the average distance between our method from the
actual shortest path to each of these 100 destinations
(d), we used the mean absolute percentage deviation
(MAPD):
devλ =
1
100
d=100∑
d=1
|Lλd − Ld|
Ld
where Lλd is the length of the shortest path found by
our method for a given value of λ, and Ld is the length
of the shortest path to destination d. Figure 8 shows the
average deviations devλ for different values of λ, and we
see that λ = 0.5 has the lowest deviations at just 0.19%
longer on average. This indicates that our greedy algo-
rithm produces short paths close to the optimal ones.
In Appendix A, We use our relay selection ap-
proach to implement the nearby guard proposal, a de-
fense mechanism proposed by Sun et al. [30], on TorPS,
the Tor path simulator [23].
7.2 Preemptively built circuits
When computing distances, we need to know the loca-
tion of the final destination. The destination addresses
can be either an IP address or a DNS hostname. If the
address is IP, we can find the destination’s location by
using IP geolocation databases (we use Maxmind [3] in
this paper) and find the shortest path to these destina-
tions. But most of time, the addresses are DNS host-
names. To find the location, we first need to perform
DNS resolution to get the IP address. In the DNS res-
olution process, the party performing DNS lookup re-
turns the closest content provider or replica sever to
itself, which in Tor’s case means the closest ones to the
exit nodes.
In Tor, however, the client saves time by having a
number of circuits already built and available for new
connections. Building a new circuit takes time for nu-
merous protocol messages and public-key cryptographic
operations. Wacek et al. showed that LASTor, which
builds new circuits once the destination location is dis-
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Fig. 9. The location of the existing servers in Alexa Top 1000
websites. Red stars show the cluster centroids.
covered, suffers from significant added delay due to these
delays [33].
To solve this issue, we build circuits in advance that
shorten the path between the source and the most popu-
lar destinations online. To identify popular destinations,
we use the Alexa Top 1000 websites [1]. Because some of
these sites use CDNs or replica servers, we visited them
from different places in thew world. In particular, we
selected 13 planet-lab nodes based on Tor users’ statis-
tics [6]. From each node, we visited all of the 1000 sites,
got the address of all fetchable elements in their front
pages, and resolved their addresses if needed. For exam-
ple, from our planet-lab node on the US west coast, we
got 46,306 hostname addresses, leading to 2894 unique
IP addresses from 346 unique locations. We clustered
the obtained locations into four clusters using the k-
means algorithm (we got better performance for four
rather than with three or five clusters), and we use the
centroids of these clusters as a target destination. Fig-
ure 9 shows all obtained locations and our cluster cen-
troids. From these four target destinations, we mark the
one closest to the client as the default destination, i.e.
when we have no other information, we assume that the
users is more likely to visit sites located closer to her.
We have the client build circuits in advance of their use
with short paths to these four target destinations. We
check our circuit list once per second to ensure that we
have at least one circuit to each of these destinations
and ensure that a new connection can be handled as
quickly as possible.
7.3 Guard Selection
In Tor, each client selects and uses one guard consis-
tently for a period of nine to ten months. This means
that for selecting the path, the guard relay is already
selected, before the exit. We thus cannot use the exit’s
location to help pick the entry and must modify our
algorithm. In selecting the guard, instead of using the
exit node’s location, we use the closest of the four tar-
get destinations to the client to compute Dentry. Dentry
will be computed as:
Dentry = λ×Dclient−entry + (1− λ)×Dentry−target
This can reveal some information about the client’s lo-
cation, e.g. through fingerprinting attacks that identify
the guard from the exit [18]. Since we only have four
popular destinations, however, the anonymity sets for
clients’ location will be quite large. We evaluate the se-
curity of our design in Section 9. Further performance
improvement can be achieved by using Dguard−exit in-
stead of Dclientexit in computing Dexit because we have
already selected the guard relay and know its location.
This helps us to not have long circuits in case the guard
is relatively far from the client.
During this research, we found a bug in the Tor
source code that was causing Tor clients to choose
guards from all the available relays, not the ones with
the guard flag. This harmed both anonymity and per-
formance. The bug was reported to the Tor project4 and
was fixed in Tor version 2.7.6. We use the corrected code
in all of our simulations.
7.4 Attaching streams to the circuits
In Section 4.2, we introduced and evaluated different
strategies of attaching streams to the circuits, and we
found that using RTT Only offers the best performance.
Our relay selection mechanism tries to find the short
paths between the client and the destination. There-
fore, we use RTT then length to pick the fast and short
circuits in the rest of the work.
An alert reader may wonder why we do not use RTT
to construct circuits given its strong performance in se-
lecting completed circuits. We note that RTT is not
available before constructing the circuit, and so it can-
not be used when picking relays. Sherr et al. used esti-
mated latencies for their relay selection algorithm [28],
but Wacek et al. found that CAR was more effective
than this technique [19]. In our approach, we seek to
build more circuits, most of which should have reason-
able performance, and then use RTT measurements to
select the current best circuit from this set. This pro-
vides the benefits of using RTT with less risk of not
having any high-performing circuits.
4 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/17772
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Fig. 10. Median TTFB and TTLB for web clients
8 Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our pro-
posed relay selection method compared with Tor and
congestion-aware routing (CAR), the current state of
the art [33]. In all the experiments in this section, we use
Shadow with the same network configuration as used in
Section 5. We evaluate the performance of our method
as α and λ vary.
The effect of α. For evaluating different values of
α, we set λ = 0.97 and vary α from 0.0 to 1.0, we have
chosen λ high to stretch circuits between the clients and
destinations. Figure 10 shows the median of web clients’
TTLB and TTFB with respect to α, where we plot only
the median of the results for readability. Changing α
from 0.0 to 1.0 yields 7% to 24% improvement in web
clients’ TTFB compared to CAR, and 2% to 12% im-
provement in web clients’ TTLB compared to CAR. Re-
lay bandwidth is more important in improving perfor-
mance, which matches findings from Wacek et al. [33].
We will explore the trade-offs in security in Section 9.
The effect of λ. Parameter λ controls the elasticity
of the path. As λ increases, the circuit stretches out,
with guards moving toward the clients and exits moving
toward the destinations. To evaluate the effect of λ, we
set α = 0.0. We find that performance changes less than
2% as λ varies, and it is best for λ of 0.4-0.5.
9 Security analysis
We now examine the impact of our path selection strate-
gies on anonymity using three models. First, we study
broad system-wide measures of anonymity. We then ex-
amine path compromise rates in the presence of AS ad-
Strategy Gini Coef. Entropy
vanilla 0.725 9.702
α = 1.0 0.724 9.713
α = 0.9 0.590 10.326
α = 0.8 0.490 10.609
α = 0.7 0.444 10.735
α = 0.6 0.401 10.802
α = 0.5 0.370 10.872
α = 0.15 0.335 10.933
α = 0.1 0.338 10.944
α = 0.0 0.341 10.945
Table 1. Relay adversary. System-wide security results.
versary. Finally, we study a set of targeted attacks in
the relay level adversary.
9.1 System-wide Security Metrics
We simulated the proposed path-selection strategies in
a 2127-relay model of the Tor network, built by sam-
pling approximately one-third of the nodes of each type
(exit, entry, middle) from a descriptor file from Decem-
ber 2015. In our simulations, 200 clients are placed ac-
cording to statistics about users from the Tor metrics
portal, and each client constructs 27,000 paths. In our
location-based approaches, the clients select paths using
the four target destinations as described in Section 7.2.
We created in total 5.4 million paths for different values
of α, with λ = 0.97.
To measure anonymity, we focus on end-to-end traf-
fic confirmation attacks in which the adversary controls
both the exit and entry relays in a circuit. We mea-
sured the Gini coefficient and Shannon entropy of the
exit-entry combinations occurring on selected circuits.
The Gini coefficient is a measure of the equality of relay
selection, where 0 represents pure equality (i.e. each re-
lay is selected uniformly at random) and 1 represents a
state of complete inequality (i.e. a given relay is always
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Fig. 11. AS Adversary. The median stream compromised rate as α and λ vary
selected) [29, 33]. Table 9.1 shows the results for Gini
coefficient and entropy.
In our static path selection method, we cannot pro-
duce equivalent results for CAR, since circuits dynami-
cally change in their method. Wacek et al. report that
CAR has a lower (i.e., better) Gini coefficient than Tor
but slightly lower (i.e., worse) entropy [33]. As shown in
Table 9.1, as α decreases, the Gini coefficient decreases
and the entropy increases. As we expect, for α = 1.0,
which selects the relays only based on bandwidth, the
results are nearly the same as vanilla. The most dra-
matic difference in anonymity occurs for higher values
of α, e.g. from α = 1.0 and α = 0.8, where the Gini
coefficient drops from 0.724 to 0.490 and entropy rises
0.9 bits.
Since αmeans increasing the share of distance in the
selection weights, we see that emphasizing distance in
the weights improves the system-wide security metrics.
On the other hand, according to Figure 10, small values
of α offer lower performance. We thus face a trade-off be-
tween security and performance, where decreasing α im-
proves security but offers less performance benefits. Val-
ues of α between 0.8 and 0.5 offer both good security and
performance, with a Gini coefficient of between 0.370-
0.490 and almost 20% improvement in TTFB compared
to CAR.
9.2 AS Adversary
In this section, we evaluate the security of our approach
in the presence of AS-level adversaries. The same as our
security analysis in Section 6.2, we use Shadow with
the same configuration as previous sections and carry
out simulations for different α and λ values.
For evaluating the effect of α, we fix λ = 0.97 and
vary α from 0.0 to 1.0. For each value of α, we extract
all the generated streams along with their attached cir-
cuits in the simulation. For all the streams, we find
the AS paths between the clients and guards (guards
and clients) and between the exits and the destinations
(destinations and exits) using the algorithm proposed
by Qiu and Gao [27]. We consider the possibility of an
asymmetric traffic correlation attack that can happen
between the data path and ack path. Figure 11a shows
the median stream compromise rates. As we see, by in-
creasing α from 0, the compromise rate starts decreasing
until α reaches around 0.5, where we have the mini-
mum compromise rate. After α = 0.5, the compromise
rate again increases until we have the worst case at α =
1.0, which is close to vanilla’s and CAR’s compromise
rates. The compromise rate in CAR is slightly better
than vanilla.
To evaluate the effect of λ on the security, we set
α = 0.0 and vary λ from 0 to 1.0. Figure 11b shows the
median compromise rate as λ varies. As we expect, when
λ increases, the compromise rate generally decreases.
This results from stretching the circuits closer to the
communication end points, which in turn reduces the
chance of common ASes appearing on both the entry
and exit sides traffic.
9.3 Targeted Attacks in Relay-Level
Adversary
To further explore how path selection strategies perform
against attacks in the relay level model, we now examine
four types of attacks in the network and measured how
often adversaries can compromise a circuit. We assume
that a circuit is compromised if both the exit and entry
nodes are controlled by the adversary.
In the targeted attacks, we consider a high-
bandwidth adversary that owns a few high-bandwidth
relays such that its bandwidth is a considerable frac-
tion of the network’s total bandwidth. In particular, we
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start with our 2127-relay model of the Tor network as
described in Section 9.1. We select a random bandwidth
in the range [20 MiB/s, 220 MiB/s], where 220 MiB/s is
the maximum bandwidth in our model network. A mali-
cious relay with this bandwidth is added to the Tor net-
work, where the location of the malicious relay is based
on our attack strategies. This process is repeated until
the target attacker bandwidth for this run of the experi-
ment is reached. For each of 200 runs at each bandwidth
setting, we place one client into the network using a lo-
cation based on Tor metrics data and have it pick 9,000
paths for each of our tested strategies. We use the four
popular destinations as described in Section 7.2 for our
strategies. In our evaluations, we consider four different
attack strategies as follows:
1.Targeted Clients: In this attack strategy, in each
run that we add the client and malicious relays, all
the malicious guards are located in the exact loca-
tion of the client, just as if the adversary could run
all of his guards in the client’s room. The malicious
exit relays are randomly placed in locations based
on the geographical distribution of Tor relays.
2.Targeted Destination: In this attack strategy, in
each run that we add the malicious relays, all the
malicious exits are located in the exact location of
the one of the randomly selected popular destina-
tions, just as if the adversary could run all of its
exit relays in the same server room. The malicious
guard relays are randomly placed in locations based
on Tor relays geographical distribution.
3.Targeted Destination and Client: In this attack
strategy, in each run that we add the client and the
malicious relays, all the malicious exits are located
in the exact location of the one of the randomly
selected popular destinations, and all the malicious
guards are located in the exact location of the client.
4.Non-targeted: In this attack strategy, in each run
that we add the malicious relays, all the malicious
relays are randomly placed in locations based on the
geographical distribution of Tor relays.
Figure 12 shows the fraction of compromised paths with
respect to the percentage of total bandwidth controlled
by the adversary’s relays for vanilla,α = 0.5,α = 0.8, and
α = 0.9.As shown in Figure 12, the compromise rate for
Targeted Destination is almost the same as compromise
rates in vanilla. For Targeted Client and for Targeted
Destination and Client, the compromise rates for α =
0.5,0.8, and 0.9 are worse than vanilla, and as the ad-
versary’s bandwidth fraction increases, the gap between
them and vanilla increases. For both Targeted Client
and for Targeted Destination and Client, α = 0.8 has
almost the same compromise rate as α = 0.9 but bet-
ter compromise rate than α = 0.5. For Non-targeted we
observed the same compromise rate as vanilla for α =
0.5,0.8, and 0.9 because in this attack malicious relays
are randomly located in the network and all relay selec-
tion methods pick the malicious relays with the same
probability.
We also note that this is a trade-off with the mod-
est, but wide-spread, security benefits of using α = 0.8
on Gini coefficient, entropy, and compromise rates com-
pared with α = 1.0, for example. Greater emphasis on
bandwidth leads to better performance and more re-
silience to targeted attacks, while greater emphasis on
distance leads to more diffuse spreading of load on the
network.
10 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the implications of our find-
ings and the scope for future research.
Circuit Selection. We evaluated the impact of dif-
ferent number of pre-built circuits on Tor performance,
and found that having at least three pre-built circuits
ready results in a significant improvement compared to
vanilla Tor. Preparing more than three circuits, how-
ever does not provide much additional benefit and may
also add more load on the network. Our circuit selection
mechanisms also kill unused circuits after five minutes,
which raises the rate of exploring for better circuits.
Relay Selection. In relay selection, combined weight-
ing seems to provide a trade-off of performance and
anonymity. As the weights emphasize on the bandwidth,
α is high, combined weighting provides higher perfor-
mance. On the other hand, higher values of α could not
provide diverse paths. As α goes down and the weights
are inclined toward the distances, the performance im-
provement decreases, but the created circuits are more
diverse. Low values α suffer from a greater chance of
targeted relay-level attacks. Overall, we think that com-
bined weighting with α = 0.8 seems to provide the best
trade-off of performance and anonymity. The best value
of α may vary with network configuration, bandwidth
distribution, geographical dispersion of relays, and the
client’s location. We will examine setting α more care-
fully in future work.
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Fig. 12. Targeted Attacks: Fraction of circuits compromised. X-axis shows the percentage of exit and guard bandwidth controlled
by the attacker.
Nearby guards. Our evaluations showed that the pro-
posed defense, picking guards close to the clients, does
not effect an AS-level adversary. The AS path between
the clients and guards is not highly correlated with
the geographical distance between them. The AS path
length between the guards and clients depend on the
clients’ networks, guards’ networks, and their ASes re-
lationships with other ASes. Moreover, the clients and
guards are not uniformly distributed on the globe and
on the network. For example, a single AS, AS16276, is
contributing more than 170 guards to the Tor network,
which is 16% of all the guards in January 2015. The
other issue is guard rotation, as currently Tor clients
change their guard after 9 to 10 months. In our 10-
month TorPS simulations, the median number of guard
changes for clients was five times, with a minimum of
two times and a maximum of 29 times. Thus, even if the
client is secure due to the short AS path, after guard ro-
tation, she may pick a guard that has a long AS path
length and get compromised. We evaluate the nearby
guards in Appendix A.
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A Nearby Guards
Tor is known to be vulnerable to adversaries observing
the entry and exit traffic, since a simple traffic corre-
lation attack [24, 25, 30] can link the user to the des-
tination (an end-to-end attack). If an adversary sits on
the first and the last hop of the path, the adversary can
see both sides of the traffic and carry out the traffic
correlation attack. The adversary may perform this at-
tack by controlling components of the network, like Au-
tonomous Systems (ASes) or Internet Exchange Points
(IXPs). As a defense against such AS-level adversaries,
Sun et al. suggest picking guards close to the clients [30].
This results in having fewer ASes in the path on the en-
try side of the traffic and can decrease the chance that
an adversary can observe both ends of the traffic.
A.1 Attacker Model.
We evaluate the security of nearby guards in terms of
both relay-level and network-level adversaries.
Relay-Level Adversary Model. We examine the se-
curity of nearby guard in the presence of relay-level ad-
versaries. We use TorPS in this evaluation and consider
the case that the attacker targets a specific user. We
analyze two relay-level adversaries, high bandwidth and
low bandwidth adversaries. In low bandwidth adversary
we consider that the attacker adds one low bandwidth
guard to the network and places it in the target’s lo-
cation, and in high bandwidth adversary, the attacker
adds one high bandwidth guard in the target’s location.
These two evaluations can show how much bandwidth
and distance matter in compromising streams.
Network-Level Adversary Model. To analyze the
security of nearby guards in the network level, we simu-
late the proposed algorithm in TorPS to get the paths.
We follow the same methodology as our network-level
adversary in circuit selection and relay selection in ob-
taining the AS paths and measuring compromise rates.
A.2 Network Model.
To evaluate the consequences on security of using guard
nodes close to the client, we use TorPS, a tor path sim-
ulator that uses realistic models to mimic users’ web
browsing behavior, and historical data to model the net-
work. TorPS builds the circuits using Tor’s path selec-
tion code and real consensuses and server descriptors.In
our TorPS simulation, we consider 30 client ASes and
picked the client ASes from top client ASes found by
Edman et al. [15] and Tor Metrics [6]. We ran the sim-
ulations in two time periods, for one month of Tor de-
scriptor data each, from February 2015 to March 2015,
with 500 clients in each of 30 client ASes (15,000 clients
total), and for 10 months of Tor descriptor data, from
February 2015 to November 2015, with 100 clients in
each of 30 client ASes (3,000 clients total).
A.3 Implementation of nearby guards
Malicious ASes can perform traffic correlation attacks
passively over the traffic passing through them, or they
could use one of RAPTOR attacks [30] to actively hi-
jack the traffic and put themselves in the paths between
the guard and the client. Sun et al. proposed as a de-
fense against these attacks is to pick guards close to the
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Fig. 13. Time to first compromise in 10-month simulations
clients [30], since short paths mean fewer ASes and thus
less chance of malicious ASes being on the path between
the client and the guard. This approach has never been
evaluated. On the other hand, if clients select nearby
guards, it means that a relay-level adversary can run
some guards close to a targeted client and increase his
chance to be selected. This suggests a trade-off between
the two attacks. In this section, we examine this trade-
off in detail.
We partially evaluated the effect of picking close
guards in Section 9.2, and we showed that a large value
of λ reduces the compromise rate in the presence of
an AS-level adversary. Since changing λ also affects the
path to the destination, we now isolate the study to
picking guards close to the client.
To examine the impact of close guards, we use the
TorPS simulator [23] to generate streams and build cir-
cuits. TorPS is a path simulator that uses real Tor data
and realistic models to mimic Tor path selection behav-
ior. We used the typical user model in the TorPS config-
uration, which consists of Gmail, Google Chat, Google
Calendar, Docs, Facebook, and web search activity. We
consider 30 client ASes in our simulation and pick these
ASes in a way that covers both top client ASes as iden-
tified by Edamn et al. [14] and the geographical dis-
tribution of Tor users [5]. In our model, we place 100
users on each AS (3,000 users total). We modified the
TorPS path selection module to implement the selection
of nearby guards. We change the weight of candidate re-
lays for the guard position in the relay selection module
according to our weighting function from Section 7.1
(w = α × wB + (1 − α) × wD). The only difference is
in Dentry, we remove parameter λ and redefine the dis-
tance as Dentry = Dclient−entry, the distance between
client and guard. In other words, we ignore the distance
to the destination because we want to only evaluate the
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proximity of guards to the clients not destinations. Note
that we only change the weights for guard selection; the
selection process for other positions, exit and middle,
remains the same as vanilla.
A.4 Relay-level adversary
In evaluating the threat of relay-level adversaries, we use
the methodology of Johnson et al. [23] and considered
an adversary running a guard relay.5 When α is low,
the guard’s bandwidth does not have significant role in
the selection weight. On the other hand, for high val-
ues of α, the guard’s bandwidth plays a notable role in
the weights and guard selection. Given these facts, we
considered a high bandwidth and a low bandwidth adver-
sary in our evaluations. The high bandwidth adversary
injects a guard relay with 55 MBps bandwidth, which
is in the top 5% of guard bandwidths as of February
2015. The low bandwidth adversary adds a guard relay
with 2MBps bandwidth, which is in the bottom 10%
of guard bandwidth and the minimum bandwidth for
getting the guard flag. In both cases, for each client we
placed the malicious guard in the client’s precise loca-
tion (i.e. Dentry = Dclient−entry = 0).
Figure 13 shows the cumulative probability of the
time to the first stream get compromised for different
cases. As expected, both low bandwidth and high band-
width adversaries have the same time to first compro-
mise for α = 0.0 because the share of bandwidth is zero
in weights and the distance only matters. In high band-
width adversary, when α increases, time to first compro-
mise decreases, as shown α = 1.0 has the worst time
5 We only analyze the guard compromise, the case the clients
select the malicious guards, not full compromise that the clients
pick both malicious guard and malicious exit. We assume that if
the client picks a malicious guard, some of her streams passing
through that guard will be compromised.
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to first compromised guard. In the low bandwidth ad-
versary,when α is low the malicious guard’s weight is
higher and has more chance to be picked. As shown in
the figure, the time to first compromised guard is almost
the same for α equal to 0.5 and 0.0 because WD is dom-
inated the the weights. For α = 1.0 in low bandwidth
adversary, none of clients picked the malicious guard
during the 10-month simulation.
Figure 15 shows the fraction of compromised
streams as α changes for one month simulation of both
adversary models. As we see, the compromise rate is
high for high bandwidth adversary as α changes, because
the malicious relay has high selection weight for both
high and low values of α. The compromise rate decreases
for low bandwidth adversary as α increases because the
malicious relay’s selection weight is low in high values
of α.
A.5 AS level adversary
In this section we assume that the adversary controls
a single AS and applies the traffic correlation attack
in order to de-anonymize users. Picking guards close to
the clients is assumed to decrease the AS path between
the client and the guard. As a result of this, the chance
of appearing a common AS on the both entry and exit
sides of the traffic seems to decrease. To evaluate this
theory, we run TorPS modified with our guard selection
scenario for different values of α for one months and
and 10 months the same as the previous selection con-
figurations. We find that the fraction of compromised
streams is very high in all cases and almost completely
independent of alpha. Clients will have a compromised
stream within one hour of using Tor, and picking nearby
guards does not help.
An important reason for this is that the number of
ASes is not significantly reduced by having shorter dis-
tances. To see the relationship between the geographi-
cal distance (between guards and clients) and AS path
lengths (the number of AS between guards and clients),
we extracted all guards picked by our clients as α =
0.0 and computed their distance between guard-client
pairs and their AS path lengths. Fig 14 shows a scatter
plot of guard-client distances and their AS path lengths.
There is not a clear relationship or correlation between
the distance and AS path lengths; for all short and long
distances, the majority of paths lengths have three or
four ASes.
B Modified Tuning Function
In this appendix, we describe our modification to the
Snader-Borisov tuning function. Figure 16a shows the
original Snader-Borisov family of functions for different
values of s.
In this function, for a performance-concerned user
there is still a chance to choose low bandwidth relays.
When the number of performance-concerned users in-
crease, high bandwidth relays would be over-utilized
and become congested, which would result in these users
actually experiencing worse performance. We modified
this function to address these shortcomings as shown:
fs : [0 1]→ [0 1]
fs(x) =
1− psx
1− ps ×
(
1− 1−Gmin
Smax
× s
)
(3)
In this function, Gmin (Gmin ∈ [0 1]) determines
the smallest pool of high weight relays that users are al-
lowed to use in s = Smax (Smax is maximum acceptable
selection parameter), and p lets us control the curva-
ture of the graph. Figure 16 shows the modified tuning
function (the function presented by Snader et al. [29] is
a special case of our modified tuning function for p = 2
and (Gmin = 1).
Controlling the curvature is useful when we need to
balance the load on high weight relays if they are getting
congested. Decreasing the curvature leads to decreasing
the probability of choosing high weight relays, which
it means we can control their load. This function also
helps users to withdraw some portion of low weight re-
lays depend on their selection parameter, but they can-
not reach less than (Gmin× 100) percent of high weight
relays, which prevents them from choosing a small set of
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Fig. 16. (a) Snader-Borisov family of functions; (b) Our tuning function as s varies; (c) Our tuning function as p varies. Gmin = 0.25
and Smax = 20.
high weight relays. As shown in Figure 16b, if we have
n relays, as s increases from zero to Smax, the pool that
users are allowed to select relays includes from all n re-
lays to Gmin × n relays.
C Breaking Ties
In Section 7, we introduced a weighting function that
mixes geographical distance and bandwidth to select
relays for the circuit. Using a combined function to
weight relays requires combining two rather different
quantities—one being a measure of edges and another
being a measure of the node—in a non-standard way.
In this section, we propose a simple alternative: we first
use one metric, bandwidth or distance, to narrow down
the list of relays and then use the other metric to “break
the tie” and pick among the smaller list.
C.1 Distance-first
In this approach, we first select a set of relays with low
distance (where distance is defined depending on its po-
sition in the circuit) and then select a high-bandwidth
relay from this set. As in combined weighting, we as-
sign weights wB and wD to each relay as defined in
Equation (3). To choose a relay for each position in the
circuit, we first fill a bucket with k relays, selected based
on their distance weights wD. In particular, we use our
relay selection function (see Section 7) with weights wD
to pick k relays from among all relays flagged for the
given position in the circuit, i.e. exit, entry, or middle.
Note that this is a probabilistic selection, not a deter-
ministic one, i.e. we do not take the k closest relays.
Then among the k relays in the bucket, we again use
our relay selection function with weights for bandwidth
wB to pick the relay.
The key parameter in this method is the bucket size
k. A large bucket will contain many relays, such that
more of them are likely to have high bandwidth, but it
will also make it more likely to pick a relay farther from
the best path. A small bucket is less likely to have poor
choices in terms of distance, but it is also less likely
to include high-bandwidth relays. We choose to have
k = b√nc, where n is the number relays available for
the specific position in the circuit. This setting puts a
greater focus on distance than bandwidth.
C.2 Bandwidth-first
The other way to select relays in this approach is to use
bandwidth to narrow down the list of relays and then
select from among these high-bandwidth relays to get
low distance. In particular, we use our relay selection
function with bandwidth weights wB to get a bucket
of k relays. We then apply our relay selection function
with distance weights wD to select the relay. Here, large
bucket size means potentially shorter paths but lower
bandwidths, while small bucket size should yield high
bandwidth choices with little optimization for distance.
We again choose k = b√nc, which should ensure high
bandwidth on average.
D Targeted Attacks in Relay
Selection Adversaries
The compromised circuit rates in different relay-level
adversaries.
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Fig. 17. Fraction of compromised paths
